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NOTE
Underbanked: Cooperative Banking as a Potential
Solution to the Marijuana-Banking Problem
Patrick A. Tighe*
Numerous states have recently legalized recreational marijuana, which
has created a burgeoning marijuana industry needing and demanding access
to a variety of banking and financial services. Due, however, to the interplay
between the federal criminalization of marijuana and federal anti-money
laundering laws, U.S. financial institutions cannot handle legally the proceeds
from marijuana activity. As a result, most financial institutions are unwilling
to flout federal anti-money laundering laws, and so too few marijuana-related
businesses can access banking services. This Note argues that the most viable
policy option for resolving this “underbanking” problem is a financial cooper-
ative approach such as a cannabis-only financial cooperative. Even in light of
federal anti-money laundering laws, this Note contends that the Federal Re-
serve is legally authorized to grant some cannabis-only financial cooperatives
access to its payment system services under the Monetary Control Act of 1980.
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Introduction
A recent New York Times article illustrates the current landscape of ma-
rijuana legalization as follows:
In his second-floor office above a hair salon in north Seattle, Ryan Kunkel is
seated on a couch placing $1,000 bricks of cash—dozens of them—in a rum-
pled brown paper bag. When he finishes, he stashes the money in the trunk of
his BMW and sets off on an adrenalized drive downtown, darting through
traffic and nervously checking to see if anyone is following him.1
The scene in Ryan Kunkel’s office and his subsequent drive evoke thoughts
of a Hollywood action movie, complete with furtive conduct, high-speed
chases, and money. But in this brave new world of state-led initiatives to
decriminalize marijuana, Kunkel’s experience is far from exceptional. Under
Washington law, Kunkel legally co-owns and operates five medical-mari-
juana dispensaries.2 Although states are free to decriminalize marijuana,3
and the marijuana industry is booming in the twenty-three states that have
done so, marijuana is still illegal under federal law. Due to the ongoing fed-
eral prohibition, marijuana-related business owners such as Kunkel struggle
to access banking services, making it difficult to open bank accounts and
deposit the proceeds from their businesses.
The federal government regulates almost all banks in the United States.
Since federally regulated financial institutions cannot legally accept the pro-
ceeds from marijuana activity due to federal anti-money laundering laws,4
most financial institutions prohibit marijuana business owners from open-
ing accounts and receiving other types of financial services. Despite the legal
consequences, a minority of financial institutions provide banking services
to marijuana-related businesses. But without access to the vast majority of
financial institutions, state-legalized marijuana businesses effectively operate
only in cash. From the state’s perspective, a cash-only industry increases
concerns about public safety and regulatory oversight. Struggling to access
banking accounts, loans, and credit, marijuana-related businesses resort to
elaborate schemes to protect their money—hiring private security, using
private vaults, or taking alternating transportation routes. Due to the ongo-
ing federal prohibition, this marijuana industry problem is properly charac-
terized as “underbanking”—too many marijuana businesses are demanding
access to banking and financial services without success.
1. Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. Times (Jan.
11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/us/banks-say-no-to-marijuana-money-legal-
or-not.html [http://perma.cc/5A7M-CX5A].
2. Id.
3. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62
UCLA L. Rev. 74, 100–13 (2015) (explaining why the federal government, even if it wanted to,
could not stop state marijuana-legalization efforts using the federal government’s preemption
power under the Supremacy Clause).
4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2012).
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Federal efforts to address the underbanking problem have been unsuc-
cessful. Guidance from federal financial regulators—and efforts by state offi-
cials to clarify the federal guidelines—have not induced more banks to enter
the market. Furthermore, although many proposals to solve this problem
abound, most either require federal legislative action or will not actually
resolve the problem. Even though a majority of Americans now favor legali-
zation,5 congressional action to resolve this problem is unlikely given the
current political environment in Washington, D.C.
Since congressional action is unlikely, states such as Colorado have
taken action into their own hands. In 2014, Colorado passed legislation au-
thorizing cannabis-only co-ops and granted a state charter to a cannabis-
only credit union.6 While still requiring the Federal Reserve’s approval, these
co-ops and credit unions, once approved, will enable marijuana businesses
to access basic banking services currently denied to them.
When Colorado passed this legislation, commentators called the initia-
tive a “charade” and unrealistic,7 in large part because many critics believe
that the Federal Reserve is unlikely to approve these ventures.8 Approval
from the Federal Reserve, however, may not be as unlikely as critics suggest.
Not only have federal regulators already demonstrated a willingness to as-
suage this problem,9 but the Federal Reserve is legally authorized to allow a
cannabis-only credit union to access its payment system services.
This Note argues that the financial cooperative approach, especially a
cannabis-only credit union, is the most viable option to resolve the un-
derbanking problem, despite commentators’ doubts. Part I explores how
federal regulatory efforts have failed to induce banks to provide services to
marijuana-related businesses. Part II argues that many of the commonly
touted policy solutions to the underbanking problem would not sufficiently
remedy the problem. Part III contends that a financial cooperative approach
is not an unrealistic solution, as some critics suggest, because the Federal
Reserve is legally authorized to grant some cannabis-only financial coopera-
tives access to the Federal Reserve’s payment system services under the Mon-
etary Control Act of 1980.
5. Marc Fisher & Richard Johnson, A Brief History of Public Opinion on Marijuana Le-
galization, Wash. Post (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-brief-history-
of-public-opinion-on-marijuana-legalization/2014/02/21/77c04e40-9b4a-11e3-975d-107dfef7b
668_graphic.html [https://perma.cc/GW84-7S5f].
6. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-108(2)(a) (2014).
7. Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 597,
639 n.220 (2015).
8. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 162–163.
9. See infra Section I.C and accompanying notes (detailing how the Department of Jus-
tice, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), among others,
have attempted to alleviate this underbanking problem).
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I. The Failure of Federal Efforts to Remedy the
Underbanking Problem
Section I.A explores how shifting public opinion and state laws
decriminalizing marijuana have engendered a robust legal marijuana indus-
try. Section I.B discusses how financial institutions are reluctant to provide
services to many marijuana-related businesses because of federal anti-money
laundering laws. Section I.C explains that, despite federal efforts clarifying
how financial institutions can provide banking services to marijuana-related
businesses, banks have not done so because the legal risks remain high. Col-
lectively, Part I demonstrates that states that have legalized marijuana are left
in a quagmire about how to provide banking services and get cash off the
street.
A. A Robust and Growing Marijuana Industry
In 1970, only 12 percent of Americans supported legalizing the posses-
sion and use of marijuana.10 But in 2013, for the first time in this century, a
majority (52 percent) of Americans supported legalizing marijuana.11 With
this shift in public opinion, state laws have changed accordingly. Despite the
continuing federal prohibition on marijuana, twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia have legalized medical marijuana.12 In 2012, Colorado
and Washington became the first two states in the country to legalize recrea-
tional marijuana.13 Colorado and Washington also became the first jurisdic-
tions not only in the United States, but the world, to legalize the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana.14 Following Colorado and Washington’s lead,
in 2014 Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia legalized recreational
marijuana.15
Unsurprisingly, this tide of state-led legalization has created a large and
growing marijuana industry. The national marijuana market was valued
10. Fisher & Johnson, supra note 5.
11. Id.
12. 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, ProCon.org, http://medicalmarijuana.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881#summary [http://perma.cc/GG95-NJA2]
(last updated July 1, 2015); see also Josh Harkinson, Map: The United States of Legal Weed,
Mother Jones (Nov. 5, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/map-
united-states-legal-marijuana-2014-2016 [http://perma.cc/2UAW-XAB2].
13. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana-laws-eased-
in-colorado-and-washington.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Y653-YJRL].
14. See generally Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: What Eve-
ryone Needs to Know 138–40, 160 (2012).
15. Matt Ferner, Alaska Becomes Fourth State to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, Huf-
fington Post (Nov. 5, 2012, 4:52 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/05/alaska-
marijuana-legalization_n_5947516.html [http://perma.cc/N99L-F8ZK].
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around $1.5 billion in 2013.16 By 2019, the industry is expected to grow to
around $10.2 billion.17 Additionally, states benefit by taxing this burgeoning
market. For example, while substantially downgrading its initial tax esti-
mates, Colorado collected nearly $44 million in tax revenue from marijuana
in 2014 alone.18
As the marijuana industry expands, marijuana-related businesses need
access to a variety of banking services such as corporate accounts, payroll
services, and credit and lending services.19 Due to the federal criminalization
of marijuana, however, many marijuana-related businesses struggle to access
the most basic financial services. Without the ability to open a banking ac-
count, marijuana-related businesses cannot deposit their revenue, write
checks to pay suppliers and employees, or obtain loans to expand their oper-
ations.20 This lack of access creates many concerns about public safety and
regulatory oversight.
B. Federal Law Has Created the Underbanking Problem
Although this burgeoning industry needs banking services and is oper-
ating legally under state law, federal law prevents banks from providing ser-
vices to marijuana-related businesses. The federal prohibition is a product of
the interplay between the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and federal anti-
money laundering laws,21 such as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)22 and the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA).23 In the United States,
almost all financial institutions—including those chartered by state banking
agencies—are regulated by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
16. ArcView Grp., The State of Legal Marijuana Markets: Executive Summary 4
(3d ed. 2015), http://www.arcviewmarketresearch.com/s/Executive-Summary-The-State-of-Le
gal-Marijuana-Markets-3rd-Edition-d2qk.pdf [http://perma.cc/2KQ8-SAEW].
17. Id. at 6.
18. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Office of Research & Analysis, Marijuana Taxes,
Licenses, and Fees Transfers and Distribution (2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/
sites/default/files/1214%20Marijuana%20Tax%2C%20License%2C%20and%20Fees%20Re
port.pdf [http://perma.cc/HLU3-AQ7L].
19. See Editorial, Marijuana Dispensaries Need Access to Banking System, Bos. Globe
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/09/09/legal-marijuana-
sellers-need-access-banking-system/w2Dy5xWNqyHK09Ip5pZW5H/story.html [http://perma.
cc/5W4C-A3B6].
20. See id. (“Because the drug remains illegal under federal law, marijuana-related busi-
nesses nationwide have struggled to find banks that will accept their deposits.”).
21. Money laundering is the process of transforming the (monetary) proceeds from ille-
gal activity into ostensibly legitimate money or other assets. Lilian B. Klein, Bank Secrecy
Act/Anti-Money Laundering 2 (2008).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
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(OCC), or the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).24 Conse-
quently, almost all banks and financial institutions are subject to federal law,
including the CSA, BSA, and MLCA.25
The CSA prohibits the manufacture and distribution of marijuana.26
Moreover, federal law criminalizes aiding and abetting27 and conspiring to
violate federal law.28 Consequently, it is illegal to aid and abet or to conspire
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana. Thus federal law prohib-
its banks and other financial institutions from assisting with the manufac-
turing, distribution, or dispensing of marijuana.
The BSA and the MLCA require financial institutions to ensure that the
monetary proceeds from marijuana activity do not enter the nation’s bank-
ing system. The BSA aims “to prevent banks and other financial service
providers from being used as intermediaries for, or to hide the transfer or
deposit of money derived from, criminal activity.”29 To achieve this purpose,
the MLCA prohibits individuals and entities, such as financial institutions,
from laundering the proceeds from marijuana activity.30
24. The United States has a dual banking system. To operate as a bank or financial insti-
tution, a financial institution must obtain either a federal or state charter. If a bank wants to
operate with a national charter, it receives a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). The OCC then regulates and supervises the financial institution. Moreover,
all nationally chartered banks are members of the Federal Reserve and subject to its regulation.
While a state bank receives its charter from a particular state, a state-chartered bank is required
under federal law to obtain FDIC insurance (and be regulated by the FDIC) or become a
member of the Federal Reserve (and be regulated by the Federal Reserve). A credit union can
also obtain either a federal or state charter. If a credit union wants to operate with a national
charter, it obtains a charter from the NCUA and is regulated by the NCUA. Internal Reve-
nue Serv., Internal Revenue Manual § 4.26.9.4 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/
irm_04-026-009.html#d0e1909 [http://perma.cc/NA7R-BH6F]. If a state-chartered credit
union is required under state law to obtain federal insurance, it obtains insurance from the
NCUA and is also subject to NCUA regulations. Id. Most states require state-chartered credit
unions to obtain federal insurance from the NCUA. Hill, supra note 7, at 617–18. Conse-
quently, almost all financial institutions are regulated by federal financial agencies and subject
to federal law. Id. at 606–07.
25. Hill, supra note 7, at 607–12.
26. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 802(6), 812(c) (2012).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. . . .
Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another
would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.”).
28. Id. § 371 (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).
29. Klein, supra note 21, at vii.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. A financial institution can launder money in a number of
ways. If a financial institution knowingly “conducts or attempts to conduct . . . a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” the institution
has engaged in money laundering if it either (1) intends “to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity”; (2) knows “that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . .
to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity”; or (3) knows “that the transaction is designed in
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The BSA and other laws establish reporting mechanisms that allow fi-
nancial institutions to demonstrate that they are not laundering money.
First, the BSA requires financial institutions to engage in customer due dili-
gence to verify the identity of the potential accountholder,31 the source of
the funds in the account, the purpose of the account, and the customer’s
primary source of business.32 Second, financial institutions must file Suspi-
cious Activity Reports (SARs) with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work (FinCEN), a federal bureau within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury that enforces the federal anti-money laundering laws.33 These re-
ports notify the federal government if “the bank knows, suspects, or has
reason to suspect that . . . [t]he transaction involves funds derived from
illegal activities or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise
funds or assets derived from illegal activities.”34
Financial institutions and their employees face significant penalties for
violating the MLCA and BSA. Financial institutions could lose their char-
ters,35 and bank employees could be barred from banking.36 Furthermore,
the BSA and MLCA authorize criminal prosecution of individuals for money
laundering. Bank employees face up to twenty years in prison for each
money-laundering transaction. Banks and their employees could also be
fined $500,000, or twice the value of the transaction, whichever is greater.37
Additionally, any property involved in the transaction or traceable to the
illegal proceeds, including bank accounts, could be subject to criminal38 or
civil forfeiture.39
Despite these severe penalties, some financial institutions provide bank-
ing services to a small number of marijuana-related businesses. While con-
crete evidence is hard to come by, anecdotes abound. For instance, “more
than a dozen cannabis businesses [in Washington allege that] they all keep
corporate accounts at Chase, U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo, in addition to
whole or in part . . . to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law.”
Id. § 1956(a)(1). Additionally, a financial institution can launder money by “knowingly en-
gag[ing] or attempt[ing] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of
a value greater than $10,000.” Id. § 1957(a). Under the MLCA, a “specified unlawful activity”
entails “the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance” under
the CSA, which includes marijuana activity. Id. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(f)(3); 21 U.S.C
§ 812(c)(c)(10).
31. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.312 (2014).
32. Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Launder-
ing Examination Manual 25, 63–65 (2010) [hereinafter FFIEC Manual], https://
www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/BSA_AML_Man_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7MJM-TBYD].
33. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2); FFIEC Manual, supra note 32, at 1, 67–80.
34. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2).
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(d)(1), 1772d, 3105(i) (2012).
36. Id. § 1818(e)(7).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 982(a)(1).
39. Id. § 981(a)(1)(A).
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small, local banks.”40 In Colorado, marijuana-related businesses closely
guard where they bank. These businesses fear that their banks will stop giv-
ing them access if the banks become inundated with too many requests for
banking services from other marijuana-related business.41
The marijuana-related businesses that access banking services either
deceive financial institutions or identify financial institutions that are willing
to turn a blind eye toward the account holder’s business activity. By creating
a non-marijuana-related holding company, some marijuana-related busi-
nesses deceive financial institutions into thinking their business activity is
legal under federal law.42 Such deception is possible if the financial institu-
tion does not engage in thorough customer due diligence.43
Less risk-averse financial institutions may be willing to provide services
under the table. This is likely if, from the financial institution’s perspective,
the benefits of providing such services outweigh the potential civil and crim-
inal liability.44 Because many financial institutions are unwilling to know-
ingly violate federal anti-money laundering laws, marijuana-related
businesses have fewer financial institutions with which to engage. Conse-
quently, the financial institutions that do provide services can extract high
fees for accepting proceeds from marijuana-related activity and charge
above-market interest rates for extending credit. In return for flouting the
law, these financial institutions receive large deposit balances from a busi-
ness operating within a profitable and growing industry.45
Providing these services may also benefit the financial institution’s repu-
tation. More marijuana-related businesses may seek to do business with the
financial institutions that exposed themselves to significant risk. This height-
ened customer loyalty may prove helpful if the federal government ends its
prohibition and financial institutions can legally provide such services.
While a bank’s willingness to provide services largely depends on its “risk
appetite,”46 anecdotal evidence suggests that some banks are willing to pro-
vide services if the benefits outweigh the severe penalties for doing so under
the BSA and MLCA.
40. Jose Pagliery, Legal Marijuana’s All-Cash Business and Secret Banking, CNN Money
(Apr. 29, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/29/smallbusiness/marijuana-cash/
[http://perma.cc/5RXW-8WX4].
41. See David Migoya, Where Colorado Pot Shops Bank Is Closely Guarded Trade Secret for
Some, Denv. Post (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:37 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/marijuana/ci_25
244700/where-colorado-pot-shops-bank-is-closely-guarded [http://perma.cc/377E-9WUS].
42. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FIN-2014-G001,
BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses 5 (2014) [hereinafter BSA
Expectations], http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/8GVT-W5XR].
43. See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
44. The Risk of “Legalized” Marijuana to the Banking Industry, Wolters Kluwer Fin.
Servs., http://www.wolterskluwerfs.com/points-ahead/risk-of-legalized-marijuana-to-banking
-industry.aspx [http://perma.cc/FR4U-F6WY].
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Because most marijuana-related businesses cannot access basic banking
services, the industry operates largely as a cash-only industry.47 For example,
since Visa and MasterCard are federally regulated financial institutions, they
prohibit use of their debit and credit cards for purchases at marijuana-re-
lated businesses.48 Consequently, consumers must use cash to purchase ma-
rijuana products at dispensaries. Without access to a bank account,
marijuana-related businesses must store and secure the cash on-site or at
some other location, including private residences.49 Some businesses have
even hired private security companies to process, store, and secure their pro-
ceeds.50 Additionally, marijuana-related businesses rely on employees to
handle large amounts of cash,51 increasing concerns about employee theft
and mismanagement of funds since cash leaves little to no paper trail. With-
out access to financial institutions’ payroll services, businesses must also pay
their employees in cash. These employees may then similarly struggle to de-
posit their earnings in their checking accounts if a bank knows about their
means of employment.52
From the state’s perspective, an industry that operates in cash presents
two main issues. First, a cash-only industry increases public safety concerns.
Since there is more cash on the streets to facilitate transactions, states worry
more about crime, especially robbery and burglary.53 The state has even sus-
pended some businesses’ licenses because there have been too many burgla-
ries and robberies there.54
The second problem is that a cash-only industry hinders effective regu-
latory oversight.55 Because activists have pitched legalization in part on its
ability to generate tax revenue for the state, ensuring that a marijuana-re-
lated business pays its state and local taxes is essential. Since the industry is
largely cash-only, however there is no paper trail,56 making it harder for state
47. See generally BSA Expectations, supra note 42.
48. Robin Sidel, Plastic and Pot Collide in Colorado, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 2014, at C1.
49. Pagliery, supra note 40.
50. Bruce Kennedy, Colorado Agrees to Cannabis “Credit Co-Ops”, CBS News (June 9,
2014, 7:18 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-agrees-to-cannabis-credit-co-ops/
[http://perma.cc/KZ4B-835U].
51. See Kovaleski, supra note 1.
52. Id.
53. See John Ingold & Ricardo Baca, Burglaries at Denver Marijuana Shops Slow, but
Industry Still Worried, Denv. Post (June 16, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/mari
juana/ci_25969469/burglaries-at-denver-marijuana-shops-slow-but-industry [http://perma.cc/
2BPV-KD8W] (noting that, despite these industry concerns, Denver’s Department of Safety is
reporting that the city’s marijuana-related businesses—which are the majority of Colorado’s
marijuana-related businesses—are on pace to have the lowest amount of robberies and burgla-
ries in three years).
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See, e.g., Pagliery, supra note 40.
56. Id. (“[The fact that] weed is bought with paper money . . . . could hinder Washing-
ton’s ability to properly tax pot businesses, because the state will have a difficult time tracking
sales.”).
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regulators to ensure that marijuana-related businesses pay the proper
amount of taxes.57 Since marijuana-related businesses cannot access banking
services, they must pay their taxes in cash (and may even incur fees for
paying taxes in cash).58
In addition to states’ public safety and regulatory oversight concerns,
marijuana-related businesses also face other issues stemming from the un-
derbanking problem. First, the underbanking problem restricts industry
growth. While state officials may not be concerned with industry growth,59
expanding business operations is difficult without access to credit.60 Instead
of obtaining a loan to purchase a new cultivation site or proper grow light-
ing, marijuana-related businesses must make purchases in cash. The cash-
only nature of the business also creates a guise of illegality.61 That is, even
though marijuana is legal under state law, business owners feel like criminals
when forced to deal only in cash. This may discourage business owners from
entering the recreational-marijuana market. From the industry’s perspective,
access to banking services lends legitimacy to their business.
C. Federal Regulators Have Not Resolved the Problem
Federal regulators have provided regulatory guidance in an effort to in-
duce financial institutions to provide services, but they have had little suc-
cess. First, in August 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the Cole
Memo to all U.S. Attorneys, providing guidance regarding marijuana en-
forcement under the CSA in light of state-led marijuana-legalization initia-
tives.62 The guidance applies to all federal enforcement activity, including
criminal investigations and prosecutions, concerning marijuana in all
states.63 Essentially, the DOJ decided that federal law enforcement should
not target marijuana activity operating legally under state law as long as (1)
the state in question “will implement strong and effective regulatory and
enforcement systems” and (2) the activity permitted under state law does
not implicate one of the DOJ’s eight marijuana enforcement priorities.64
57. See Klein, supra note 21, at 2 (“Th[e] paper trail operates to deter illegal activity and
provides a means to trace movements of money through the financial system.”).
58. David Migoya, IRS Fines Unbanked Pot Shops for Paying Federal Payroll Tax in Cash,
Denv. Post (July 2, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26075425/irs-
fines-unbanked-pot-shops-paying-federal-payroll [http://perma.cc/C8PL-TQJR].
59. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 1–2 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo],
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QUP8-45TD].
60. See Kovaleski, supra note 1.
61. Id.
62. Cole Memo, supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. Id. (“[C]ertain enforcement priorities . . . are particularly important to the federal
government: [p]reventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; [p]reventing revenue from
the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; [p]reventing the
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other
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Following the Cole Memo, FinCEN issued guidelines to financial insti-
tutions on how they could comply with the BSA if they decided to provide
financial services to marijuana-related businesses.65 According to FinCEN’s
guidelines, a financial institution has to: (1) engage in additional and signifi-
cant customer due diligence before providing services to a marijuana-related
businesses66 and (2) submit different types of marijuana-specific SAR filings
when providing services to marijuana-related businesses.67 The stated pur-
pose of these guidelines is to “enhance the availability of financial services
for, and the financial transparency of, marijuana-related businesses.”68
The FDIC and the NCUA followed suit, providing additional guidance.
These two insurers guarantee that the financial institutions they insure com-
ply with federal law, such as the BSA, by conducting regular examinations.69
If a financial institution is found to be in violation of the BSA, the FDIC and
NCUA can issue civil penalties or revoke the institution’s deposit insurance
(thereby effectively closing the institution).70 The FDIC and NCUA in-
structed their examiners to verify that a financial institution is complying
states; [p]reventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext
for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; [p]reventing violence and the
use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; [p]reventing drugged driving
and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana
use; [p]reventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety
and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and [p]reventing
marijuana possession or use on federal property.”).
65. BSA Expectations, supra note 42, at 1.
66. Id. at 2–3 (“[C]ustomer due diligence . . . includes (i) verifying with appropriate state
authorities whether the business is duly licensed and registered; (ii) reviewing the license ap-
plication (and related documentation) submitted by the business for obtaining a state license
to operate its marijuana-related businesses; (iii) requesting from state licensing and enforce-
ment authorities available information about the business and related parties; (iv) developing
an understanding of the normal and expected activity for the business, including the types of
products to be sold and the type of customers to be served (e.g., medical versus recreational
customers); . . . (vi) ongoing monitoring for suspicious activity, including for any of the red
flags described in this guidance; and (vii) refreshing information obtained as part of customer
due diligence on a periodic basis and commensurate with the risk. . . . [A] financial institution
should [also] consider whether a marijuana-related business implicates one of the Cole Memo
priorities or violates state law.”).
67. Id. at 3. The different types of SAR filings include “Marijuana Limited,” “Marijuana
Priority,” and “Marijuana Termination.” A “Marijuana Limited” SAR is a report that a finan-
cial institution would file with FinCEN indicating that the institution: (1) is “providing finan-
cial services to a marijuana-related businesses” and (2) “reasonably believes, based on its
customer due diligence,” that the marijuana-related business “does not implicate one of the
Cole Memo priorities or violate state law.” Id. at 3–5. A “Marijuana Priority” SAR is a filing in
which a financial institution indicates to FinCEN that it reasonably believes, based on its cus-
tomer due diligence, that a marijuana-related business implicates one of the Cole Memo pri-
orities or violates state law. A “Marijuana Termination” SAR is filed when a financial
institution deems it necessary to terminate a relationship with a marijuana-related business in
order to maintain an effective money-laundering compliance program. Id.
68. Id. at 1.
69. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1784(a), 1820(b) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 741.1 (2015).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i), (a)(2), (e)(2).
814 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:803
with FinCEN’s guidelines if the institution provides services to marijuana-
related businesses.71 To date, the other federal financial agencies that enforce
the BSA and MLCA—the Federal Reserve and the OCC—have not issued
guidance, despite a joint request from the governors of Colorado and Wash-
ington to do so.72
In spite of this effort, federal guidance has not alleviated the legal con-
cerns of the financial and banking sector, for four reasons. First, while the
DOJ and FinCEN have issued guidelines about nonenforcement, the under-
lying laws—the CSA, BSA, and MLCA—have not changed. It is still illegal
for financial institutions to launder the proceeds from marijuana-related
businesses, and the federal guidance does not offer financial institutions le-
gal immunity from federal prosecution. Moreover, none of the guidelines
detail what repercussions a bank may face if it makes a good-faith effort to
comply but ultimately fails. Given the lack of legal immunity, these guide-
lines effectively require a bank to incriminate itself in order to comply. The
bank must file official documentation with the federal government demon-
strating that it is engaging in money laundering, which could expose the
bank to great risk.
Second, these guidelines are not legally binding.73 The current, or new,
executive administration could change them. A financial institution could
then be held liable for civil and criminal penalties on the basis of the incrim-
inating documentation (for example, the marijuana-specific activity reports)
it produced under the current federal enforcement guidelines.
Third, these guidelines are incomplete. Only three out of the five main
federal regulators charged with enforcing federal anti-money laundering
laws have issued BSA guidelines to date. Financial institutions and the mari-
juana industry need guidance from the Federal Reserve and the OCC, not
just FinCEN, FDIC, and NCUA, in order to assess whether to enter the ma-
rijuana banking market.
Finally, if a financial institution is still willing to provide services despite
these legal risks, it would have to comply with new and untested SAR filing
71. See, e.g., Letter from Doreen R. Eberley, Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Ken Boldt,
Acting Comm’r, Div. of Banking, Colo. Dep’t of Regulatory Agencies (July 15, 2014); Letter
from Larry Fazio, Dir., Office of Examination and Ins., Nat’l Credit Union Admin., to Scott
Jarvis, Dir., Wash. State Dep’t of Fin. Insts. (July 18, 2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/
banks/ncua-marijuana-letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/KX4G-J6AA].
72. Letter from John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colo., & Jay Inslee, Governor of Wash.,
to Janet Yellen, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Thomas J. Curry, Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Martin J. Gruenberg, Chair-
man, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., & Debbie Matz, Chairman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin. (May 23,
2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/governors-letter-05-23-14.pdf [http://
perma.cc/N3K7-MV9P].
73. Cole Memo, supra note 59 (noting that this is only guidance and not binding law);
Audrey Wright-Cipriano, Buzz Kill, Indep. Banker (July 29, 2014), http://independentbanker.
org/2014/07/lender-life-10/ [http://perma.cc/JY2B-RFXF] (quoting the communications direc-
tor for the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, stating that FinCEN’s
guidance is not binding and needs to be codified into law to adequately protect financial
institutions).
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and customer due diligence requirements. Before the marijuana-specific
SARs, SAR filings and customer due diligence were already incredibly tedi-
ous and resource intensive.74 Now, with FinCEN’s new guidelines, financial
institutions must file “Marijuana Limited” SARs and continuing activity re-
ports whenever a marijuana-related business deposits, withdraws, or trans-
fers money from or to its account.75 Financial institutions also must engage
in ongoing customer due diligence to ensure that a marijuana-related busi-
ness complies with state and local laws and the DOJ’s Cole Memo priori-
ties.76 FinCEN’s marijuana-specific BSA guidance potentially discourages
smaller banks—banks that might be more willing to assume the risks of
providing services to marijuana-related businesses—from doing so because
these banks lack the resources and mechanisms necessary to comply with the
heightened reporting requirements.
Despite these efforts to assuage industry concerns with the federal gui-
dance,77 federal regulators have not induced financial institutions to provide
banking services to the marijuana industry. According to FinCEN, only “105
individual financial institutions from states in more than one third of the
country [are] engaged in banking relationships with marijuana-related busi-
nesses.”78 This amounts to less than 1 percent of financial institutions in the
country.79 While FinCEN has received around 1,000 SARs from financial
institutions, almost half of these SARs are “Marijuana Termination” SAR
filings, indicating that a bank has terminated its relationship with a mari-
juana-related business.80
74. Shaheen Pasha, Government Spying on Your Bank Accounts: Financial Institutions Pass
Along Personal Information if There’s a Hint of Suspicious Activity, CNN Money (Aug. 9, 2006,
3:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/09/news/economy/banks_secrecy/ [http://perma.cc/
8PLS-E67J].
75. See BSA Expectations, supra note 42, at 3–4.
76. Id. at 3.
77. The state of Washington also hosted a forum in June 2014 for financial institutions
about how to comply with FinCEN’s BSA guidelines for marijuana-related businesses. At this
forum, a representative from FinCEN discussed FinCEN’s guidance and answered bankers’
questions. Through these forums, the state of Washington has tried to induce banks to provide
services to marijuana-related businesses by providing information and reducing BSA compli-
ance concerns. James Pearson, DFI Open Forum on Banking the Marijuana Industry, Anthem
(July 1, 2014), http://www.nwcua.org/compliance/blog/dfi-open-forum-on-banking-the-mari
juana-industry [http://perma.cc/K9KL-6ZLR].
78. Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Remarks at the 2014 Mid-
Atlantic AML Conference 4 (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/pdf/
20140812.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WFK-W2JH].
79. In 2010, there were 7,666 FDIC-insured financial institutions in the United States
and around 7,000 federal- and state-chartered credit unions. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statis-
tical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Banking, Finance, and Insurance 735, 738
(2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1162.pdf [http://perma.cc/
RY6U-QEMF].
80. See Calvery, supra note 78, at 4–5.
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Additionally, few banks are willing to publicly announce that they are
providing such services. In Washington, only two banks have publicly an-
nounced they are providing banking services to marijuana-related busi-
nesses: Numerica Credit Union and Salal Credit Union.81 In Colorado, only
one credit union, Fourth Corner Credit Union, openly provides financial
services to marijuana-related businesses.82
Overall, federal guidance—and state efforts to clarify such guidance—
has failed to encourage financial institutions to enter the marijuana-banking
market. Thus, scholars and state legislators have proposed other ideas to
alleviate this problem. As the next Part demonstrates, however, none of
these policy proposals are feasible.
II. Current Policy Proposals Miss the Mark
In light of the public safety and regulatory concerns characteristic of a
cash-only industry, states that have legalized marijuana—whether for me-
dicinal or recreational purposes—must determine how to remedy the un-
derbanking problem in the absence of effective federal action. Existing
proposals include (1) instituting a cooperative federalism approach; (2)
amending the CSA either to remove marijuana altogether or to reschedule it
as a Schedule II substance; or (3) using decentralized virtual currency. As
this Part demonstrates, some of these proposals would resolve the un-
derbanking problem but are politically unfeasible. Other proposals, even if
implemented, would not legally solve the problem because they fail to ade-
quately address the cause of the problem. Despite their flaws, these proposals
are positive developments because they contribute to a discussion about the
issue and help increase pressure on Congress to act.
A. Instituting a Cooperative Federalism Approach
Some scholars propose cooperative federalism as a solution to the un-
derbanking problem.83 Cooperative federalism is “a partnership between the
States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective.”84 In
other words, the federal government and state or local government work
81. Missy Baxter, Washington Credit Unions Move to Serve Pot Biz, Credit Union Times
(May 16, 2014), http://www.cutimes.com/2014/05/16/washington-credit-unions-move-to-
serve-pot-biz [http://perma.cc/PQN6-464E].
82. David Migoya, Colorado Pot Credit Union Could Be Open by Jan. 1 Under State Char-
ter, Denv. Post (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26980328/
colorado-pot-credit-union-could-be-open-by?source=infinite [http://perma.cc/23EN-4V2W].
83. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 3.
84. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992); see also Chemerinsky et al., supra
note 3, at 116 (“[C]ooperative federalism allows federal and state laws to solve problems
jointly rather than conflict with each other. In the interest of cooperation, certain federal
statutes permit cooperative agreements between the federal government and the states to solve
issues of mutual concern.”).
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together, rather than independently, to tackle a specific public problem. In-
stead of imposing a one-size-fits-all program on the states, the federal gov-
ernment sets a standard, requirement, or priority for the states to meet.
Then, each state or local government chooses to: (1) develop state- or local-
ity-specific implementation plans, regulations, or enforcement strategies to
achieve the federal standards85 or (2) allow the federal government to di-
rectly intervene and implement a federal program in the state or locality.86
In essence, Congress offers the states “the choice of regulating [an] activity
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal
regulation.”87 In theory, under cooperative federalism the states and the fed-
eral government work together to resolve policy issues while respecting
states’ rights.
In the marijuana context, Professor Chemerinsky proposes a cooperative
federalism approach. Under this approach, “the federal government . . . al-
low[s] states to govern marijuana laws and regulations within their borders
so long as the state regulatory schemes comply with specified federal re-
quirements.”88 If a state met specified federal criteria, the federal govern-
ment would permit the state to opt out of the CSA’s marijuana provisions.89
Consequently, “[s]tate law satisfying these federal guidelines would exclu-
sively govern marijuana activities within those states opting out of the CSA
but nothing would change in those states content with the CSA’s terms.”90
Chemerinsky suggests that the specified federal criteria could mirror the
guidelines and enforcement priorities set forth in the DOJ’s Cole Memo.91
To ensure that the cooperative federalism model addresses the underbanking
problem, Chemerinsky’s proposal could be adapted to include a BSA/MLCA
85. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 815 (1998)
(“According to this conventional wisdom, state and local officials do not enforce merely their
own laws in their distinct policymaking sphere. . . . These nonfederal governments help imple-
ment federal policy in a variety of ways: by submitting implementation plans to federal agen-
cies, by promulgating regulations, and by bringing administrative actions to enforce federal
statutes. Thus, cooperative federalism offers us a vision of independent governments working
together to implement federal policy.”); see also Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federal-
ism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, 558 (2000).
86. Greve, supra note 85, at 558 (“[T]he states may choose to administer the federal
program or else, cede the regulatory field to the federal government.”).
87. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
88. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 3, at 114.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 74.
91. See id. Chemerinsky suggests that whether a state could opt of the CSA would de-
pend on if the state could institute a strong and effective marijuana regulatory system that
would not implicate one of the aforementioned federal marijuana enforcement priorities. Id.
at 114.
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waiver for financial institutions that decide to provide banking services to
marijuana-related businesses operating legally under state law.92
A major advantage of Chemerinsky’s proposal is that it facilitates legisla-
tive compromise on a controversial issue. A slight majority of Americans
support the legalization of marijuana, which means that many Americans
still oppose it.93 Instead of forcing Congress to engage in the politically diffi-
cult process of repealing parts of the CSA that criminalize marijuana,
Chemerinsky’s approach reserves the option for states to either follow the
CSA or not with regards to marijuana. Moreover, a cooperative federalism
approach provides political cover to states’ rights conservatives who may not
generally support marijuana legalization but who seek to enhance federal
respect of state autonomy. Thus, a cooperative federalism approach may be
politically easier to achieve than, say, a repeal of specific aspects of the CSA,
because a diverse political coalition may unite to support it.
A problem with Chemerinsky’s cooperative federalism approach is that
it requires federal legislative action. While this approach may facilitate legis-
lative compromise, the current political and legislative environment is par-
ticularly caustic to advancing any legislative initiatives.94 In 2013, U.S.
Representative Perlmutter introduced a bill entitled, “Marijuana Businesses
Access to Banking Act of 2013.”95 While the bill would have resolved the
underbanking problem, it effectively died in committee.96 Given this envi-
ronment, Congress is unlikely to support a substantial new piece of legisla-
tion to remedy this problem. Thus, the possibility of passing a bill through
both houses of Congress, let alone a bill regarding a cooperative federalism
approach for marijuana, is highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, a cooperative federalism approach to marijuana legaliza-
tion would resolve the underbanking problem if Congress passed such a law.
92. Whether FinCEN’s marijuana-specific SAR filing requirements would still apply
under a cooperative federalism approach is a question of policy that the legislative or executive
branch would have to address.
93. See, e.g., Fisher & Johnson, supra note 5.
94. The 113th Congress (2013–2014) is widely acknowledged as the most unproductive
Congress in (recent) history, having only passed around fifty-five substantive laws in its first
session. E.g., Chris Cillizza, Yes, President Obama Is Right. The 113th Congress Will Be the Least
Productive in History, Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/04/10/president-obama-said-the-113th-congress-is-the-least-productive-ever-is-
he-right [http://perma.cc/E9AS-843X]; Drew DeSilver, Congress Ends Least-Productive Year in
Recent History, Pew Res. Ctr. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12
/23/congress-ends-least-productive-year-in-recent-history/ [http://perma.cc/K3XU-YUXW].
95. H.R. 2652, 113th Cong. (2013).
96. Am. Bankers Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions: Marijuana and Banking 1
(2014), https://www.aba.com/Tools/Comm-Tools/Documents/ABAMarijuanaAndBank-
ingFAQFeb2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GHW-896M]. Recently, however, the Senate has voted
out of committee an amendment to the Financial Services and General Government Appropri-
ations bill that would “allow state-compliant marijuana businesses to engage in relationships
with financial institutions.” Danielle Keane, Senate Committee Votes in Favor of Marijuana
Banking Bill, Norml (July 23, 2015), http://blog.norml.org/2015/07/23/senate-committee-
votes-in-favor-of-marijuana-banking-bill/ [http://perma.cc/EF69-T8RN].
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Although federal legislative action is unlikely, a bill proposing a cooperative
federalism approach generates additional pressure for federal legislative ac-
tion, especially since this proposal might facilitate legislative compromise
between states’ rights conservatives and pro-drug legalization liberals.
B. Amending the CSA
One of the most commonly proposed policy solutions to the un-
derbanking problem is amending the CSA. Some legislators propose remov-
ing marijuana as a controlled substance under the CSA, thereby ending the
federal marijuana prohibition.97 Others argue that marijuana should be re-
scheduled from something other than a Schedule I or Schedule II substance
under the CSA.98 In 2011 some state governors, including those of Washing-
ton and Rhode Island petitioned the DEA to reschedule marijuana as a
Schedule II substance.99 Possibly reacting to political pressure, in June 2014
the DEA requested that the FDA review the medical evidence about the
safety and effectiveness of marijuana, which could lead to a rescheduling of
marijuana.100 While removing marijuana from the purview of the CSA
would resolve the underbanking problem, merely rescheduling it would not
sufficiently remedy the problem.
Removing marijuana as a controlled substance under the CSA would
remedy the underbanking problem if Congress could pass such legislation. If
Congress excluded marijuana from the CSA (like alcohol and tobacco, which
are explicitly excluded as controlled substances),101 businesses could legally
manufacture, distribute, and sell under federal law. If marijuana were no
longer a controlled substance, manufacturing, importing, selling, and dis-
tributing marijuana would not be considered a “specified unlawful activity”
under the MLCA.102 Consequently, there would be no federal money-laun-
dering concern, and financial institutions could legally provide services to
marijuana-related businesses under federal law. This proposal, however, also
97. See, e.g., Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong.
(2013).
98. See, e.g., States’ Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act, H.R. 689, 113th Cong. § 2
(2013).
99. John Ingold, Colorado Asks DEA to Reclassify Marijuana, Denv. Post (Dec. 29, 2011,
1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_19634321 [http://perma.cc/688R-V5Y4].
100. See Matt Ferner, FDA to Evaluate Marijuana for Potential Reclassification as Less Dan-
gerous Drug, Huffington Post (June 25, 2015, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/06/24/fda-marijuana_n_5526634.html [http://perma.cc/G7YG-LPD4]. Under the CSA,
the FDA conducts a scientific and medical analysis of the drug under consideration, makes a
recommendation to the DEA that the drug be placed in a given schedule, and then the DEA
considers the FDA’s analysis, conducts its own assessment, and makes a final proposed rule
about how to schedule the drug. Id.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2012) (“The term ‘controlled substance’ . . . does not include
distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco . . . .”).
102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(f)(3) (2012).
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requires federal legislative action, which is unlikely given the current politi-
cal landscape.103 This proposal is even more unlikely to generate federal leg-
islative action than the cooperative federalism proposal, since removing
marijuana from the CSA does not provide political cover to states’ rights
conservatives.
Rescheduling marijuana, on the other hand, would not sufficiently re-
solve the underbanking problem. Under the CSA, marijuana is a Schedule I
controlled substance.104 How a particular substance is scheduled under the
CSA effects how restrictively the DEA regulates that substance. A substance
that is classified as “Schedule I” has more restrictive licensing requirements,
for example, than a substance classified as Schedule II-IV. Since marijuana is
a Schedule I substance, physicians cannot prescribe it.105 Without a prescrip-
tion for marijuana, an individual cannot possess it under federal law.106
If Congress rescheduled marijuana as a Schedule II substance, financial
institutions could handle the proceeds derived from the sale of a prescrip-
tion for marijuana without running afoul of federal anti-money laundering
laws. Physicians can also technically prescribe Schedule II substances.107 If
marijuana could be prescribed, the sale of marijuana to those with a valid
prescription would no longer constitute “unlawful activity” under the
MLCA.
A major problem with the rescheduling proposal is that the FDA is
highly unlikely to approve marijuana for marketing, meaning physicians will
be unable to prescribe it. The CSA operates in conjunction with the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The FDCA requires companies to demon-
strate that their drugs are safe and effective for their intended uses before
marketing them in the United States,108 including drugs that are classified as
controlled substances.109 When approving a drug for marketing, the FDA
considers a variety of factors, including whether the manufacturer can con-
sistently manufacture a high-quality product and whether the product can
provide a consistent dose of the substance.110
103. In fact, H.R. 499, the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013—a bill
which would have removed marijuana from the CSA’s purview—died in committee. See
H.R.499 - Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, Congress.gov, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/499 [https://perma.cc/8FMK-ZY66].
104. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10).
105. See id. § 829 (stating that substances in Schedules II–V only can be prescribed by a
practitioner).
106. See id. § 844(a) (making it illegal to possess a controlled substance without a valid
prescription from a physician or other medical practitioner).
107. See id. § 829(a). That said, even if marijuana was a Schedule II substance, an individ-
ual would still violate federal law if he or she possessed marijuana without a prescription.
108. See id. § 355(a)–(b).
109. 21 C.F.R. § 290.1 (2015).
110. Mixed Signals: The Administration’s Policy on Marijuana, Part Four—the Health Ef-
fects and Science: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Over-
sight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 34–36 (2014) [hereinafter Mixed Signals Hearing]
(statement of Douglas C. Throckmorton, Deputy Dir. for Regulatory Programs, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.).
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Marijuana fails to satisfy the FDA’s safety and effectiveness requirements
for marketing. Marijuana is a botanical product, and as with all botanical
products, a variety of factors affect marijuana’s manufacturing and dosage
consistency.111 First, each marijuana plant can vary significantly in its com-
position of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).112 Some marijuana plants produce
differing amounts of cannabinoids. Consequently, marijuana patients can-
not receive a reproducible dose of active ingredients every time.113 Therefore,
physicians cannot consistently prescribe a certain amount of marijuana to
produce an intended effect. Second, since botanical materials can be con-
taminated by dangerous microbes such as fungi, marijuana is susceptible to
these microbes depending on how it is cultivated, harvested, and stored.114
For these reasons, the FDA has not approved marijuana as a safe and effec-
tive drug that can be prescribed.115
While rescheduling marijuana as a Schedule II substance will make it
technically easier for physicians to prescribe marijuana, the FDA is highly
unlikely to approve marijuana for sale by prescription. In fact, the FDA has
never approved any botanical material “for sale by prescription,” including
all of the “botanical raw materials that are listed in Schedule II of the
CSA.”116 Rather, the FDA approves specific medical products produced by a
particular innovator or generic manufacturer.117 This approach explains why
the FDA has not approved marijuana prescription sales but has approved the
sale of Marinol and Cesamet—specific medical products which incorporate
synthetic THC—by prescription.118
If the FDA does not permit marijuana to be sold by prescription, a fi-
nancial institution could not handle the proceeds from the sale of mari-
juana, even if rescheduled. Without FDA approval, any sale of marijuana
would still be illegal under the CSA and would constitute “unlawful activity”
under the MLCA.
Moreover, even if the FDA approved the sale of marijuana by prescrip-
tion, rescheduling marijuana as a Schedule II substance fails to adequately
address the sale of recreational marijuana. Consumers do not have to obtain
prescriptions for recreational marijuana. If marijuana-related businesses sold
111. Id. at 36.
112. See Kevin A. Sabet, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Rescheduling Won’t Solve Advo-
cates’ Medical Marijuana Problem, 58 Wayne L. Rev. 81, 87 (2012).
113. Mixed Signals Hearing, supra note 110, at 36; see Sabet, supra note 112, at 87–88.
114. Sabet, supra note 112, at 87–88.
115. Mixed Signals Hearing, supra note 110, at 30 (“FDA conducted a review of the availa-
ble data for marijuana and recommended that marijuana remain in Schedule 1, the most
restrictive schedule, both because of its high potential for abuse and because there was not
sufficient evidence that marijuana had an accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States.”).
116. Sabet, supra note 112, at 88.
117. See Caulkins et al., supra note 14, at 99.
118. See Mixed Signals Hearing, supra note 110, at 67 (statement of Rep. Connolly) (not-
ing that Marinol is a Schedule III drug that is a form of THC); Cesamet, Leaf Science, http://
www.leafscience.com/pharmaceuticals/cesamet/ [http://perma.cc/NS24-VTQP].
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marijuana to consumers without prescriptions, a financial institution could
still not handle the proceeds from these sales because the proceeds would
constitute “unlawful activity” under the MLCA.
In sum, while removing marijuana from the CSA resolves the un-
derbanking problem, rescheduling marijuana does not. The rescheduling
proposal is an insufficient legal response because it requires an additional
legal step—FDA approval of the sale of marijuana by prescription—which is
unlikely to succeed, and  because it fails to respond adequately to demands
posed by the sale of marijuana for recreational purposes.
C. Using Decentralized Virtual Currency
Decentralized virtual currency, such as Bitcoin119 or PotCoin,120 is an-
other proposed workaround to the underbanking problem. Some in the ma-
rijuana industry have even installed Bitcoin or PotCoin ATMs in their
dispensaries.121 Decentralized virtual currency is not a legitimate policy solu-
tion to the underbanking problem, however, because it still implicates fed-
eral anti-money laundering laws. Further, criminals often use such
currencies as a front for illicit activity, including international drug cartel
activity.122 Thus, state and industry members should avoid resorting to this
option.
“Virtual currencies are online payment systems that may function as
real currencies but are not issued or backed by central governments.”123
Since decentralized virtual currency does not require a single administrator
or central repository (such as a financial institution) to verify transactions,
these currencies can avoid (or evade) many U.S. federal and state financial
and banking laws.124 This perhaps led some industry members to believe
that virtual currencies could avoid federal anti-money laundering laws.
Consider an example of how virtual currency would facilitate transac-
tions in the marijuana industry. Customers would enter a marijuana dispen-
sary with their own Bitcoin  or would exchange their U.S. currency for
virtual currency at a Bitcoin ATM.125 With the now-exchanged Bitcoin, the
119. Kate Cox, Bitcoin: What the Heck Is It, and How Does It Work?, Consumerist (Mar.
4, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/03/04/bitcoin-what-the-heck-is-it-and-how-does-it-
work/ [http://perma.cc/5B8B-D5TH] (“It’s a virtual medium of exchange, not issued by,
backed by, or tied to any particular nation or government.”).
120. See Potcoin, http://www.potcoin.com [http://perma.cc/M48K-J29H] (explaining
that PotCoin is a digital currency).
121. Kashmir Hill, Marijuana Shop’s Plan to Accept Bitcoin Goes Up in Smoke, Forbes
(Feb. 10, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/02/10/irony-alert-ma
jor-bitcoin-processor-rejects-pot-shop-as-too-legally-dubious/ [http://perma.cc/J3C2-783L].
122. See infra notes 139–142 and accompanying text.
123. Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 Mich. L. Rev. First Im-
pressions 38, 38 (2013).
124. Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers 2 (2d
prtg. 2013).
125. See id. at 8.
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customers would then purchase marijuana products from the marijuana dis-
pensary owner, paying with the Bitcoin.126 The entire transaction would be
done electronically, and the business would then receive its revenue in
Bitcoin.127 In essence, the Bitcoin would function as the medium of ex-
change, taking the place of U.S. currency.
Because decentralized virtual currencies operate as a substitute for U.S.
currency during business transactions, some believe federal anti-money
laundering laws do not apply to these “currencies.” But decentralized virtual
currencies do not avoid federal law, whether in a closed system or open
system. A closed system means that the marijuana business owners never
exchange the Bitcoin back into U.S. currency but operate their businesses
solely using Bitcoin—paying their employees in Bitcoin, making business
purchases in Bitcoin, etc.128 An open system is one in which marijuana busi-
nesses freely exchange Bitcoin for U.S. currency in order to conduct their
business operations.129
Under a closed system, decentralized virtual currency does not avoid
federal anti-money laundering laws and enforcement. For instance, even if
the decentralized virtual currency is not exchanged for U.S. dollars, virtual
currency can still constitute a “commodity” and is subject to regulation by
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).130 While the
CFTC does not have policies and procedures specific to virtual currencies,131
Bitcoin could be interpreted as a commodity if used in futures132 or swaps
contracts.133 If Bitcoin is a commodity in these particular instances, it is still
subject to federal money-laundering enforcement. Under federal law, certain
types of brokers and advisors who deal with futures or swaps are required to
establish money-laundering programs.134 Some are even required to develop
126. Id. at 4–5.
127. Id.
128. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-516, Virtual Economies and Cur-
rencies: Additional IRS Guidance Could Reduce Tax Compliance Risks 3–4 (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654620.pdf [http://perma.cc/SFM9-AJ5E].
129. Id. at 3–5.
130. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (2012).
131. See The Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Effective Enforcement and the Future
of Derivatives Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 113th
Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n).
132. A futures contract is a financial contract obligating the buyer to purchase an asset (or
the seller to sell an asset) at a predetermined future date and price. Marvin M. Lager, The
Uncertain Definition of a Futures Contract, L.A. Law., Mar. 1985, at 40.
133. A swaps contract is “an agreement between two parties to exchange sequences of cash
flows for a set period of time.” Michael McCaffrey, An Introduction to Swaps, Investopedia
(Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/07/swaps.asp [http://
perma.cc/28YH-GQAM].
134. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312(c)(1)(A), 5312(a)(2), 5318(a)(2) (2012).
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BSA compliance programs, SAR filing requirements, and enhanced cus-
tomer identity programs.135 Consequently, under a closed system, individu-
als dealing with futures and swaps of Bitcoins stemming from marijuana
transactions could run afoul of federal anti-money laundering laws. Thus,
even without exchanging Bitcoins for U.S. dollars, virtual currency does not
allow businesses to evade federal anti-money laundering laws under all
circumstances.
Furthermore, once Bitcoin is exchanged for U.S. dollars in an open sys-
tem, Bitcoin is still subject to other federal anti-money laundering laws and
regulations. In an open system, a virtual currency exchanger—a type of fi-
nancial institution that exchanges virtual currency for different types of cur-
rency—is classified under federal law as a “money transmitter.”136 A money
transmitter is considered a type of money service business,137 and all money
service businesses are subject to the BSA and other federal anti-money laun-
dering laws.138 Consequently, any virtual currency exchanger would have to
comply with federal anti-money laundering laws, including FinCEN’s mari-
juana-specific BSA guidance.
One of the main advantages of virtual currency—circumventing the
federal anti-money laundering laws—is not, in fact, an advantage at all.
Whether in a closed or open system, virtual currency cannot evade federal
anti-money laundering laws. While a closed system may not implicate fed-
eral laws in all circumstances, it is an unattractive business alternative. Most
companies, service providers, and consumers do not accept or rely on
Bitcoin, so few businesspersons want to operate solely in that currency.139 A
closed system would simply be impractical, and most people want to convert
their Bitcoin into hard currency, such as U.S. dollars. Therefore, an open
system is preferable to a closed system. But the open system provides no
practical advantage over the current banking system, making virtual cur-
rency an impracticable policy alternative.
Additionally, Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are risky. Not only are
they subject to significant volatility,140 but they are often used to funnel
funds for criminal enterprises, including international drug cartel activity.141
135. Cf. 31 C.F.R. § 1026.200–.320 (2014) (detailing the reporting and recording require-
ments for “futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities”).
136. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network,
FIN-2014-R001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining
Operations (2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U3L2-4L4V].
137. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5).
138. Id. § 1022.210–.540.
139. See Simone Pathe, Most Americans Unfamiliar with and Won’t Use Bitcoin, PBS (Feb.
5, 2014, 12:56 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/americans-unfamiliar-wont-use-
bitcoin/ [http://perma.cc/K6ND-GPQ9] (“76 percent of Americans are still unfamiliar with
the digital currency and nearly 80 percent of consumers have never and would never consider
using an alternative currency.”).
140. See Brito & Castillo, supra note 124, at 20–21.
141. See id. at 23–26.
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In the Cole Memo, the DOJ indicated that it would not prosecute mari-
juana-related activity occurring legally under state law as long as such activ-
ity does not implicate certain federal marijuana enforcement priorities.142
One of these priorities is preventing marijuana-related businesses from cov-
ering for illegal drug cartel activity.143 The widespread use of virtual cur-
rency in the legal marijuana industry could raise federal law enforcement
concerns.
Because decentralized virtual currencies implicate federal anti-money
laundering laws to the same extent as hard currency, and these virtual cur-
rencies raise concerns about illicit criminal activity that could implicate fed-
eral marijuana enforcement priorities, states should ensure that marijuana-
related businesses do not resort to such means. Currently, Colorado does
not define a virtual currency exchanger as a money service business under
state law.144 But New York is in the process of doing so.145 Since virtual cur-
rency does not remedy the underbanking problem, states should amend
their money transmitter laws to prevent use of this means.146
III. Financial Cooperatives Provide a Viable Path Forward
Federal guidance and commonly touted policy proposals have not and
will not remedy the underbanking problem. Therefore, some states have at-
tempted to resolve this problem themselves. For instance, in 2014, Colorado
authorized state-licensed marijuana-related businesses to form “cannabis
credit co-ops”—a type of financial services cooperative147—and even ap-
proved a state charter for a cannabis-only credit union.148 Both of these ef-
forts are part of what this Note refers to as the financial cooperative
approach. While many commentators rejected the cannabis co-op proposal
142. See Cole Memo, supra note 59, at 2–3.
143. Id. at 1.
144. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-52-103(2), (4.3) (2014) (excluding any reference to “vir-
tual currency exchanger” or “money service business” when defining “money transmission”).
145. See Regulation of the Conduct of Virtual Currency Businesses, 37 N.Y. Reg. 17 (pro-
posed Feb. 25, 2015) (to be codified at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 200.1–.22);
N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Proposed New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, http://
www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr140717-vc.pdf [http://perma.cc/GLB7-BC2N] (“Virtual
Currency Business Activity means . . . (1) receiving Virtual Currency for transmission or trans-
mitting the same; (2) securing, storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual
Currency on behalf of others; (3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer business;
[or] (4) performing retail conversion services, including the conversion or exchange of Fiat
Currency . . . .”).
146. A state could limit use of virtual currency by amending the definition of a “money
service business” under state law to include virtual currency exchangers.
147. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-102–108.
148. See Migoya, supra note 82.
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as a “charade”149 and as something the Federal Reserve would never author-
ize,150 the financial cooperative approach is not as futile as some commenta-
tors suggest.
Regardless of what the Federal Reserve may do for policy or political
reasons,151 it does have the legal authority to grant a cannabis-only credit
union access to its payment system services.152 Although the Federal Reserve
recently denied a cannabis-only credit union access, it did not do so because
granting access to a cannabis-only credit union would violate federal anti-
money laundering laws.153 While this approach still requires federal regula-
tors to grant access, the major advantage of this approach is that it does not
require federal legislative action. Section III.A explores the financial coopera-
tive approach and specifically the cannabis-only credit union. Section III.B
argues that the Federal Reserve has legal authority to grant a cannabis-only
credit union access to the Federal Reserve’s payment system services under
the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA).
A. The Financial Cooperative Approach
Generally, a cooperative “is an autonomous association of persons
united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural
needs and aspirations.”154 In the context of banking, a financial cooperative
is “an institution without capital stock that is organized and operated for
149. David Migoya, Is the Fed Going to Do What the Banks Won’t Already Do? No., Denv.
Post, May 18, 2014, at 6K (quoting Bert Ely, a banking structure consultant).
150. See Heather Draper, Colorado’s New Cannabis Co-Ops Law: Bankers, Pot Advocates
Agree It Probably Won’t Work, Denv. Bus. J. (June 9, 2014, 7:35 AM), http://
www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/finance_etc/2014/06/colorados-new-cannabis-co-ops-law-
bankers-pot.html [http://perma.cc/6PWS-SZB4] (quoting Don Childears, President and CEO
of the Colorado Bankers Association).
151. The Federal Reserve denied access to a cannabis-only credit union in July 2015. See
Nathaniel Popper, Banking for Pot Industry Hits a Roadblock, N.Y. Times (July 30, 2015), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/business/dealbook/federal-reserve-denies-credit-union-for-
cannabis.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/HHX5-Z4HW].
152. Id. (“[I]t will be an uphill battle for the credit union to prove that the Fed does not
have the power to turn down the institution.”).
153. Cf. Trevor Hughes, Federal Bankers: No Account for Colo. Cannabis Credit Union, USA
Today (July 31, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/07/31/
federal-bankers-no-account-colo-cannabis-credit-union/30943749/ [http://perma.cc/WPT2-
GXSA] (noting that the reason for the Federal Reserve’s denial of access to a “master account”
was the National Credit Union Administration’s refusal to grant deposit insurance).
154. Co-Operative Identity, Values and Principles, Int’l Co-Operative Alliance, http://
ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles [http://perma.cc/LEL7-
X8W4]; see also Charles T. Autry & Roland F. Hall, The Law of Cooperatives 2 (2009)
(“(1) [A cooperative] is owned and controlled by the people who use its services or buy its
products (its ‘owner/customers’); (2) its primary focus is to provide its services or goods to its
owner/customers and not to the general public; (3) it is democratically controlled by its
owner/customers, and each owner/customer has one vote regardless of the amount of services
or products it purchases from the cooperative; and (4) the primary objective of the cooperative
is to maximize benefits to its owner/customers rather than profits.”).
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mutual purposes and without profits.”155 Most financial cooperatives are
subject to supervision and examination by a state or federal authority.156 The
credit union is among the most well-known types of financial
cooperatives.157
One option a state could pursue under the financial cooperative ap-
proach is to grant a charter for the formation of a cannabis-only credit
union.158 A credit union is a member-owned, not-for-profit financial coop-
erative that provides savings, credit, and other financial services to its mem-
bers.159 A cannabis-only credit union would provide banking and financial
services to marijuana-related businesses that are members of the credit
union. While credit unions provide many of the same services as other fi-
nancial institutions, their structure and focus is different. Unlike banks and
other financial institutions, which are owned by stockholders and are for-
profit institutions, credit unions “pool their members’ savings deposits and
shares to finance their own loan portfolios rather than rely on outside capi-
tal.”160 Credit unions seek to provide “a safe place to save and borrow at
reasonable rates,” whereas banks generally offer higher interest rates and
fees.161
155. Autry & Hall, supra note 154, at 105.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 4 (stating that, collectively, credit unions have over 85 million members and
assets of over $700 billion).
158. Another option is for states to pass legislation licensing the formation of cannabis-
specific financial cooperatives. Colorado did this in 2014. Under the Marijuana Financial Ser-
vices Cooperatives Act, the state of Colorado allowed marijuana-related businesses to form
“cannabis credit co-op[s].” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-108(2)(a) (2014). Empowered to pro-
vide many services, a co-op can accept deposits from members, “[m]ake loans to its members
. . . [and] to other [cannabis] co-ops . . . make deposits in state and national financial institu-
tions insured by an agency of the federal government that voluntarily accepts those deposits,”
and engage in certain investments. Id. § 11-33-107(1). Co-op members include “licensed ma-
rijuana businesses, industrial hemp businesses, and entities that provide goods or services to
licensed marijuana businesses.” Id. § 11-33-106(1). But in order for a marijuana-related busi-
ness to become a member of the co-op and consequently access its banking services, a business
must “provide[ ] documentation to the co-op of an inability to get comparable services from a
bank or credit union.” Id. § 11-33-103(5). While a co-op is required to obtain a surety bond,
see id. § 11-33-113(1)(c), a co-op can obtain approval from the Federal Reserve System Board
of Governors. Id. § 11-33-104(4)(a). The co-op is not required to obtain federal deposit insur-
ance. See id. § 11-33-104(3)(a) (“If federal deposit insurance provided by the federal deposit
insurance corporation or national credit union administration becomes available for banks,
savings and loan associations, and credit unions organized to provide financial services to the
licensed marijuana industry, the commissioner may determine that the continued issuance of
charters under this article is no longer necessary or desirable.”). As Professor Hill notes, can-
nabis-specific financial co-ops likely cannot access the Federal Reserve’s payment services. See
Hill, supra note 7, at 638–43.
159. See What Is a Credit Union?, World Council of Credit Unions, http://www.wo
ccu.org/about/creditunion [http://perma.cc/CK8K-EVB6].
160. Id.
161. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., How Is a Credit Union Different than a Bank?, MyCredit
Union.gov, http://www.mycreditunion.gov/about-credit-unions/pages/how-is-a-credit-union
-different-than-a-bank.aspx [http://perma.cc/LP3G-MKDZ].
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One advantage of this approach is that a state can use its existing legal
authority and regulatory system to grant a charter to a cannabis-only credit
union. Since states already authorize state charters for credit unions, this
approach does not require the passage of new state legislation. However, all
federal-chartered and most state-chartered credit unions are required to ob-
tain federal share insurance from the NCUA,162 and it is unclear whether the
NCUA would provide share insurance to a cannabis-only credit union.163
Another disadvantage is that a cannabis-only credit union would also have
to comply with FinCEN’s BSA requirements, including the marijuana-spe-
cific BSA requirements, if the credit union sought federal share insurance.164
To date, only Colorado has approved a state-chartered, cannabis-only
credit union, the Fourth Corner Credit Union.165 No other state has followed
suit. While the Fourth Corner Credit Union requires federal insurance from
the NCUA, the credit union can operate under Colorado law while awaiting
NCUA approval.166 Not long before the Federal Reserve’s decision in July
2015, however, the NCUA denied share insurance to the Fourth Corner
Credit Union.167
B. The Federal Reserve’s Legal Authorization
Commentators have criticized Colorado’s decision to pursue a financial
cooperative solution.168 Many of these critics assume that the Federal Reserve
is unlikely to grant these co-ops access to its payment services.169 Whether
the Federal Reserve will grant access is a separate question from whether the
Federal Reserve is legally authorized to grant access to a cannabis-only credit
162. As Hill reports, “[m]ost states . . . require federal insurance for state-chartered credit
unions.” Hill, supra note 7, at 617–18. But nine states (Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas) do not require federal insurance for state-
chartered credit unions. Because Colorado and Washington require federal insurance for a
state-chartered credit union, a state-chartered, cannabis-only credit union in Colorado or
Washington would have to obtain NCUA approval, whereas a cannabis-only credit union in
California would not have to seek NCUA approval. See id. at 623 n.129.
163. For instance, the insuring of a cannabis-only credit union by the NCUA could be
viewed as openly approving a financial institution that is violating federal drug and anti-
money laundering laws. Cf. id. at 640–41 (noting that the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to
engage in potential violations of federal law indicates that the NCUA would have similar hesi-
tations). For this reason, the NCUA may deny insurance to a state-chartered, cannabis-only
credit union.
164. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
165. See Migoya, supra note 82.
166. Id.
167. See Popper, supra note 151.
168. See Hill, supra note 7, at 643 (“One thing, however, is clear: Colorado’s cannabis
credit co-op legislation is not itself the solution to the marijuana banking problem.”).
169. Id. at 639.
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union or co-op.170 This Section argues that the MCA authorizes the Federal
Reserve to grant a cannabis-only credit union access to the Federal Reserve’s
payment system services. It then contends that the federal anti-money laun-
dering laws also permit the Federal Reserve to provide such access.
1. Interpretation of the Monetary Control Act of 1980
For a state to pursue a viable financial cooperative approach that would
remedy the underbanking problem, a financial cooperative would need a
master account with the Federal Reserve and access to the Federal Reserve’s
payment system.171 Under the MCA, the Federal Reserve must offer payment
system services to all “depository institutions.”172 In fact, even if a financial
institution is not a member of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve is still
required to provide its services at the same price as it does to its member
institutions.173 The MCA defines depository institutions as banks, credit un-
ions, mutual savings banks, savings banks, saving associations, and federal
home loan banks.174 Here, the central question is whether a cannabis-only
credit union is a depository institution under the MCA.
A cannabis-only credit union is legally authorized under the MCA to
have an account with the Federal Reserve. The MCA states that any NCUA-
insured credit union or any credit union which is eligible to apply for federal
share insurance through the NCUA constitutes a depository institution.175 A
credit union is eligible to apply for the NCUA’s federal share insurance if the
credit union is “organized and operated according to the laws of any
170. The Federal Reserve did deny a cannabis-only credit union, the Fourth Corner Credit
Union, a “master account” and access to the Federal Reserve’s payment system services. Pop-
per, supra note 151. The Federal Reserve stated that it made this decision because the canna-
bis-only credit union could “not prove[ ] how it would ‘mitigate the risk associated with
serving a single industry that does not have an established track record of success and remains
illegal at the federal level.’ ” Id. Note, however, that the Federal Reserve did not deny access
because it lacked the legal authority to do so under the MCA. Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s
decision is complicated by the fact that the cannabis-only credit union was denied insurance
by the NCUA just a few days earlier. The question remains whether the Federal Reserve would
have granted access if the credit union obtained insurance. Nevertheless, how the Federal Re-
serve responded here is a different question from whether the Federal Reserve has the legal
authority to make such a decision.
171. Financial institutions use the Federal Reserve payment systems to provide payment
services to customers. The Federal Reserve’s payment systems include: (1) Fedwire for large
electronic payments between financial institutions; (2) coin and currency services; (3) a cen-
tralized check collection system; and (4) the Automated Clearinghouse network for processing
batched electronic small-dollar payments. Hill, supra note 7, at 627–28.
172. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(2) (2012) (“All Federal Reserve bank services covered by the fee
schedule shall be available to nonmember depository institutions and such services shall be
priced at the same fee schedule applicable to member banks . . . .”).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 461(b)(1)(A).
175. Id. § 461(b)(1)(A)(iv).
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State.”176 So, if a cannabis-only credit union is organized and operated ac-
cording to a state’s laws, the Federal Reserve is legally authorized to provide
access to its payment system services because the credit union is eligible to
apply for federal share insurance.
One problem is that most states require a credit union to insure its
accounts with the NCUA before it can be granted a state charter.177 Without
the federal share insurance, a credit union will not only be denied a state
charter, but the credit union would also not be organized and operated ac-
cording to state law. If a credit union is not organized and operated accord-
ing to state law, it cannot be considered a depository institution under the
MCA’s credit union eligibility prong.178 In effect, states with a federal share
insurance requirement for state-chartered credit unions prevent the Federal
Reserve from legally recognizing a credit union as a depository institution
under the MCA.
A state could get around this problem by passing a law allowing for a
cannabis-only credit union to be chartered and operated without obtaining
federal share insurance. In lieu of federal insurance, the state could require
the cannabis-only credit union to obtain private insurance, or the state
could allow the credit union to operate without any insurance. Under this
hypothetical solution, this state-chartered credit union could be considered a
depository institution under the MCA because the credit union would still
be eligible to apply for federal insurance.179
Political and policy reasons aside, the Federal Reserve does have legal
authority to recognize a cannabis-only credit union as a depository institu-
tion under the MCA.180 This is especially true if the cannabis-only credit
union is not required by state law to obtain federal insurance, or is required
only to apply for federal share insurance through the NCUA.
2. Money-Laundering Complicity
Even if the Federal Reserve is legally authorized to provide a master
account and its payment system services to a cannabis-only credit union,
176. Id. § 1781(a).
177. See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 24; Hill, supra note 7, at 617–18.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A). This account arguably represents what happened in Colo-
rado since the NCUA denied the cannabis-only credit union federal share insurance, and then
shortly thereafter, the Federal Reserve denied the credit union a master account. See Popper,
supra note 151.
179. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring only that a credit union be eligible to
apply for NCUA insurance).
180. See id. § 1781 (stating that the Federal Reserve Board may insure unions organized
and operated by the State).
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some argue that the Federal Reserve would not do so because it would effec-
tively be violating federal anti-money laundering laws181 or aiding and abet-
ting the manufacturing and distribution of marijuana in violation of federal
law.182
While the Federal Reserve and its employees could be viewed as openly
violating federal drug laws, the concern about money laundering complicity
is misplaced. Federal law states that the Federal Reserve is authorized to “ex-
amine at its discretion the accounts, books, and affairs of . . . each member
bank and to require such statements and reports as it may deem neces-
sary.”183 The Federal Reserve is also authorized to request an examination of
the foreign operations of state banks which are members of the Federal Re-
serve184 and may provide for “special examination” of member banks so as
“to inform the Federal reserve bank of the condition of its member banks
and of the lines of credit which are being extended by them.”185 Pursuant to
these examination powers, the Federal Reserve has issued a variety of regula-
tions requiring member banks, including state member banks, to implement
BSA compliance programs and SAR filing requirements.186
These aforementioned statutes and regulations regarding the Federal Re-
serve’s examination powers are confined to member banks, however. Depos-
itory institutions encompass both member and nonmember banks, and a
cannabis-only credit union, if granted access to the Federal Reserve, would
be a nonmember depository institution.187 Consequently, these examination
powers would not extend to a cannabis-only credit union.188 In fact, the
Federal Reserve is authorized only to “require any depository institution . . .
to make . . . reports of its liabilities and assets as the [Federal Reserve] Board
may determine to be necessary or desirable to enable the Board to discharge
its responsibility to monitor and control monetary and credit aggregates.”189
While the Federal Reserve is authorized to examine financial institutions
for compliance with federal anti-money laundering laws, this authorization
is constrained to member banks.190 Since a cannabis-only credit union
181. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 7, at 640–41 (“If the Federal Reserve provided payment
services to a cannabis credit-co-op, the Federal Reserve and its employees would be engaging
in money laundering. . . . [I]t is difficult to imagine the Federal Reserve openly defying federal
drug law.”).
182. See, e.g., id. at 641 (“They might also be conspiring to manufacture and distribute
marijuana, aiding and abetting the manufacture and distribution of marijuana, and acting as
accessories after the fact . . . .”).
183. 12 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (emphasis added).
184. Id. § 481.
185. Id. § 483.
186. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.60–.64 (2015).
187. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1) (“The term ‘depository institution’ means any bank or
savings association.”).
188. See id. § 248(a)(1) (stating that the Federal Reserve is authorized to examine ac-
counts only of “member” banks).
189. Id. § 248(a)(2).
190. See id. § 248(a)(1); 12 C.F.R § 208.60–.64.
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would be a nonmember depository institution, the Federal Reserve would
not be authorized to examine such an institution for compliance with fed-
eral anti-money laundering laws.191 Consequently, the concern about non-
compliance with federal anti-money laundering laws may not be an
appropriate legal justification for denying a cannabis-only credit union ac-
cess to the Federal Reserve’s payment system services.
In sum, the Federal Reserve is legally authorized to grant access to a
cannabis-only credit union, even in light of the Federal Reserve’s obligation
to enforce federal anti-money laundering laws. Whether the Federal Reserve
will actually grant access to cannabis-only institutions is a different question.
Nevertheless, if the Federal Reserve does provide access to a cannabis-only
credit union, it will significantly ameliorate the underbanking problem.
Conclusion
The underbanking problem is a vexing issue facing states and the mari-
juana industry alike. While calls for federal legislative action are important,
Congress is unlikely to act anytime soon. Congress has, however, shown
willingness to allow federal regulators to address the underbanking problem
facing the states. While it is uncertain whether the Federal Reserve will actu-
ally grant access to its payment system services to a cannabis-only credit
union, the Federal Reserve is legally authorized to do so under the Monetary
Control Act, despite federal anti-money laundering laws. By granting access,
the Federal Reserve would significantly mitigate the underbanking problem.
Ultimately, when compared to the alternative policy proposals, a financial
cooperative approach provides the most viable path forward.
191. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (stating that the Federal Reserve is authorized to examine
accounts of “member” banks only, without stating whether it is authorized to examine ac-
counts of “non-member” banks).
